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CONSCIOUSNESS ‘CORPOREALITY’ PROBLEM

Science is a system of true statements about reality. This means that each science contains inside itself definite methodological premises and ontological assumptions concerning the structure of the reality and cognitive process, which makes scientific statements intelligent. These fundamental assumptions and premises are the philosophical basis of scientific cognition.

The real goal of psychological study is in explain the genesis of the human psyche genesis, and describe consciousness as a phenomenon of living subjectness, as matter of living conscious experience. The achievement of that goal depends also on the introduced ontological conceptions of the nature of consciousness, which determine the methodology of its study. So analyzing of the philosophical basis of psychological knowledge is rather important for solving practical problems of psychology.

The study of consciousness ‘corporeality’ is a pressing issue in of modern psychology. It is a question of its spatial-temporal arrangement, but not a problem of consciousness of spatial-temporal relations, nor a problem of consciousness as a perceived corporeality. The latter are problems of our perception of temporality of consciousness and existence themselves, the problems of understanding the internal synthesis of various phases of perception, of conception of consciousness as time

(Zeitbewußtsein), and the constitution of the corporeal experience in consciousness. But here we are dealing with understanding consciousness as a particular self-existing reality, that has definite temporal and topological characteristics as phenomena in objective reality. Such understanding of consciousness is rather problematic for psychology, because it presumes the refusal of prevailing naturalistic and epiphenomenalistic conceptions of the nature of the latter.

The problem of consciousness has a long and distinct history in philosophy. Philosophy from the very beginning regarded consciousness as a problem of ontological, existential-practical premises and the basis of human existence in the world, including the explanation of psychological phenomena. The aim of this article is to show that the problem of ‘corporeality’ of consciousness can be defined and adequately solved only within the frames of the ontological understanding of consciousness, and the tradition of its transcendental-phenomenological analysis in European philosophy. This tradition presents complex and internally contradictory intellectual formation in the history of philosophical thought, but we now put these contradictions aside and regard the latter as a definite common experience of understanding of the phenomenon of consciousness. Only within the frame of this tradition can the problem of objective method in psychology be solved, and the corresponding constructions and objectual means can be produced to imagine consciousness as the phenomenon of objective reality, that has quite definite ‘corporeality’ and spatial-temporal dimension.

1.

Psychology as a science is closely allied to definite philosophical premises, that classical New-European philosophy states to substantiate the process of cognition. We mean the fundamental idea of rational structure of observation. The rational structure of observation is a theoretical construction on which every science is based, because it is the condition of objective analysis of phenomena. Indeed, one can explain the origin of knowledge of the surrounding reality only by separating the acts of obtaining that knowledge from its contents. Those acts themselves of obtaining the information about the external world, i.e. perceptions, having once happened, occur 'unbreakable' in the meaning that having received the perception we cannot understand the way it has occurred, and everything that we have is its contents, the perceived. The solution of this problem, when it is stated in such a way, can be achieved just provided that in the 'givennesses' of the consciousness there is a certain all-embracing element, which possesses the property of immediate authenticity, of 'givenness' thru itself. The separating of such an element of our perceptions is indeed the philosophical operation *cogito*, that was first introduced by Descartes, but has become the element of thinking of all the New-European philosophy right up to Kant and Fichte. By separating *cogito* acts from all empirically given acts of perception, we can distribute the whole totality of consciousness 'givennesses' between those, which can be rationally controlled and reflectively reproduced, and those which cannot be controlled and reproduced in such a way. Having excluded the latter as empirically accidental, classical philosophy thereby sets the abstraction of observation or the abstraction of understanding. To

put it another way, it is assumed that we can cognize the world to the extent that we are able set in accordance to the uncontrolled and independent actions of the world upon the natural human reflective apparatus their equivalents — controllably reproducible formations of consciousness.

It implies that the observation is not considered to mean any act of perception of external phenomena, but a special procedure of cognizing mind, which lies in the facts that within the frames of such a constructed observation we are catching the object to the extent that we, together with this object, are catching those acts, with the help of which it is given to consciousness. Then the object is considered to mean such contents of consciousness, that can be divided from the states of subject (on the basis of *cogito* operation), that does not depend on them, and thereby can be considered by us as occurring in reality, but not in our mind.¹ Then we deal with the rational structure of the object. Otherwise, the *cogito* operation necessarily presupposes its ‘ontological double’ — the operation of objectivation: object, as the phenomenon, independent of subject’s thinking and features of individual psyche, reveals only within the frames of definite procedures of thinking itself.

Now one can attribute to the objects of observation only such properties, that fit the criterion of observability, i.e. reflective doubling independently of the real conditions of their realization. The possibility of objectification presupposes that a certain event in the world occurs as if twice: first, like a certain natural spontaneous event, ‘having imprinted’

by its influences to feeling and cognizing structure of a human, and second, repeating, in the limit to infinity, in its reproductions in his (her) consciousness now as controllable. This receives the status of the objective description: any theoretical claims must be resolved on the formations of consciousness, fitting this criterion. In particular, there realizes to be well known and scientifically fundamental differentiation between essence and phenomenon: science deals with essences of the phenomena, i.e. structures of the reality, stable and independent of the conditions of their perception whereas phenomena appear like ‘visibility’ or ‘the visible’, i.e. like formations that do not have their own objective status.

This structure of observation, which is specially developed by classical philosophy and then approved in the real process of cognition, gives not only the possibility of understanding the reality — thinking in the terms of essences of things, but the possibility of its misunderstanding. Really, the rational structure of observation creates such space of cognition, that does not depend on occasional features of psyche of the perceiving apparatus, ‘mood’ of the observing subject, his (her) individual characteristics and so on. The introduction of concept of ‘a physical body’ (and other fundamental abstractions of experimental science — ‘a particle’, ‘ideal gas’ etc.) as phenomenon, that is fully opened for the external observation and is not containing some hidden essences, is a definite organization of the observing consciousness, which determines the synonymity of concepts like ‘spatiality’ and ‘objectivity’, ‘spatiality’ and ‘materiality’, ‘objectivity’ and ‘externality’, ‘subjectivity’

¹ See Chapter 1 of Descartes’ *Principia philosophiae*, where he produced forms of thought of reality as independent on thinking and objective, but all that work is developed in the reality of thinking itself.

and ‘internal perceptibility’, ‘externality’ and ‘materiality’ etc. This abstraction (phenomenon) is opposed to another fundamental abstraction of fundamental science — the abstraction of ‘consciousness’. The category of ‘consciousness’ now may be applied only to such phenomena that has no spatial dimensionality, and can be represented and interpreted only under conditions of assuming of their reflective doubling (internal observation). And these concepts cannot have any other contents within the frames of such organized thinking. In fact, the classical differentiation between ‘soul’ and ‘body’, between ‘consciousness’ and ‘matter’ etc., is the conclusion from the analysis of this rational structure of observation, i.e. the understanding that one of the independent and primary concepts of experimental science is the assumption of definite properties of observation in terms of observed phenomena themselves and their causation.

So we cannot understand phenomena of psyche and consciousness like we understand physical phenomena: we understand *by* consciousness, but we do not understand consciousness itself. This impossibility of the objective description of consciousness in its whole empirically vital appearance were well recognized in philosophy. Rational psychology as it was historically formed inside classical psychology — in theories of Locke, Leibniz, Wolff — was in effect not a theory of psychology in a precise meaning; as it is known, it appears here a part of theory of cognition, schemes of which represents rationalizations of a vital (psychological) cognitive process, just admitting its reflective reconstruction. The comprehension of it is the basis of Kant’s thought, that the soul cannot be given to us like physical bodies are, and so rational psychology can be just

the normative discipline but in no case an experimental science. To do this one must recognize for the definite organization of consciousness — rational structure of observation — the status of the ontological ‘givenness’, that is to identify the ‘givenness’ of consciousness with its factuality, and to recognize for this identification the status of objective phenomenon. The objectification operation being applied to the problem of psychology and the description of living consciousness means the identification of psychological reality and the forms of its givenness to the cognizing subject, who himself is the result and definite formation of consciousness and psyche.

In fact, that has occurred in the history of psychology: the rational structure of observation is one of the theoretical premises of psychology as an empirical study. Really, classical psychological theories are known to be built upon the identification of consciousness with the concept of ‘subject’, that presupposes not only passive reproduction of psychological states of a human, but their absolute transparency and understanding for themselves. Consciousness is identified with mentality, with reflective doubling of mental contents, and procedures of internal observation and understanding introspection, based upon it, appear to be the principal means of the analysis of psychological processes from D. Hume to J. Mill, W. James and W. Wundt. The latter, having developed the methodology of ‘objective’ analysis, in fact proceeds from the same paradigm of understanding consciousness as internal meaning. All experimental psychology as psychophysics and psychophysiology according to the complementary principle presupposes the explanation by introspection

and understanding of psychological subjects as a constant of a rationally reproducible set of mental states.

Dualistic dissection of the reality and recognizing the substantial character of the world of human consciousness and subjectivity turns to opposite tendencies in the field of methodology. On the one hand, in philosophy there begins to dominate naturalism with its interpretation of the psychical as substance, with its ascribing to the psychical all 'corporeal' characteristics, to tell the truth, distinct from characteristics of the physical reality. On the other hand, in psychology there begins to dominate epiphenomenalism, that refuses its own ontological status of phenomena of psychology. The discussion of the method of psychological studies, that started, in fact, from the very moment of constituting psychology as an experimental science (last third of 19th century) was based upon the former recognition of the independence of physical world and psychical world. The differences in substantiating of own method of psychological studies as opposed to scientific ('physical') research originate either from recognition the latter as mediated experience and the former the immediate experience, or from the distinction between 'external' and 'internal' experiences as dealing with different realities. Nevertheless, the classical definition 'Consciousness constitutes the sum of states cognized by us' remains the basis of the offered solutions.

The successive conduct of the subject of psychology with its 'doubles' leads to a crisis in modern psychology. The recognition that the psyche itself cannot be observed separately of the language of its phenomena and expressions, leads to the appearance of conceptions that are based on the recognition of the complexity and ontological 'density' of consciousness, i.e.

the assumption inside consciousness that such links and formations inaccessible to classical procedures of reflection and controlled rational reproduction. Consciousness therefore has lost its substantial character, turning to mental formation, determined by the phenomena of existential non-mentality — for example, by ‘the unconscious’ in psychoanalysis, or ‘the structures of social practice and language’ in Marxist psychology, by its own formations in actualgenesis in genetic and gestalt-psychology, etc. The refusal of naturalistic and quasinaturalistic imaginations of human consciousness and psyche has accompanied those theories by introducing of new methods of consciousness data analysis and its secondary rationalizations by their objective-referential interpretation and reduction to initial ‘objectivenesses’ of consciousness and by the analysis of consciousness in its actual, individually integral states.

The origin of modern conceptions of consciousness is connected to the understanding that with respect to consciousness we deal with such cognitive situation, when the object of studies by its own existence shields itself in its phenomena, givenesses and formations, and, in fact, closes the possibility of its direct objective observation. Any psychological processes — sensations, perceptions, impressions, emotions, etc. — can be objectively represented as happening in the objective reality just because they are already represented thru their realization. Consciousness comes out as reality, inseparable by the means of external observation and physical research from the observation the conscious life and meanings.

It means, in fact, to recognize consciousness to have its own ontological status as a kind of special reality, that demands co-ordination in a single regulated and logically homogeneous experience the

description of cognition of definite ('physical') phenomenon and the phenomenon of consciousness itself. Or in other words, it demands the coordination of consciousness and its contents.

Subjectivity (consciousness) is a certain objective event and a phenomenon of the reality, and as such it is 'a body', that possesses all the spatial-temporal characteristics of existence. It means, that the problem of 'corporeality' of consciousness is conceptually the problem of search of consciousness' description means like such self-existent reality, the problem of interpretation of its (consciousness) objective existence without the coordination with the states of cognition subject itself and its psychophysiological apparatus. In fact, this is the problem with the objective method in modern psychology.

2.

So, the consciousness 'corporeality' problem deals with its ontological status in the structure of existence. Nevertheless, classical New-European philosophy, solving the problem of cognition, proceeds just from an ontological understanding of consciousness as some objective vital empirical event and unsubstitutable act in existence. Here we are dealing with that meditative experience that was first discovered by Descartes and then developed by the transcendental-phenomenological tradition of European philosophy.

Indeed, the nominalistic trend of the late Middle Ages leads to the philosophical overturn in views at understanding the nature of consciousness by its individualisation and psychologicalization, and its attempt to treat thinking and spirit as subjective spiritual phenomena,

and to treat knowledge as contained in consciousness, in psyche. Within the frame of such a formulation, the problem of strict and precise knowledge is bound with the understanding that the difference between the reality and its representation in cognitive thinking cannot be withdrawn by purely theoretical and speculative postulating the identity of structure of mind and structure of nature, the similarity of rationality and structure of existence, etc. In fact, beginning from Bacon, in philosophy there has existed a distinct difference between knowledge itself and its existence, that is the difference between object contents of thinking and thinking itself as an act or a state of cognitive subject. This difference has its own experimental bases: indeed, we cannot, moving in a single observation experiment from the object of influence upon our organs of sense, come to the contents in which that object 'has been reflected', 'has been imprinted', or has been understood etc. Acts of cognition have as if two connected poles, and carrying out 'physical' phenomenon at the one pole simultaneously carries out at another pole as its 'impression' or 'observation', although there is only one objective action! ²

So if we are interested in knowledge as something that really happened, as an empirical and experimental phenomenon, then the question of criteria of its authenticity comes up to the discovery of this experience, where knowledge is realized as a phenomenon, having got really ontological status. It is some unified way in classical philosophy independently of its factual and textual interpretation in the works of

² See: "although the acting and the being acted are often quite different, nevertheless the action and the exposure to action are always the same phenomenon, that has two names, because it can be related to two different subjects." Descartes. *Passions de l'âmes*. Oeuvres de Descartes publiées par Ch. Adam et P. Tannery. Réédition. T. XI, Paris 1969-1974, 327. Quot. after Декарт Р. Страсти души.// Соч. Т.1. М., 1987. С. 482

Descartes and Spinoza, Locke and Leibniz, Kant and Fichte. Really, philosophy, asking the question of conditions of revealing the soul or thought, distinctly differs those conditions — form of event of thought or knowledge — from the contents of this event: they are unnoticeable and go to the background, when the contents has already happened. This determines the formulation of the question of the possibility of cognition as a question of ontological premises of its fulfillment in specific acts of perception, impression, observation.

Being so formulated, the problem can be solved just in case are such actions admitted in the structure of cognitive act, in which the cognitive act itself shall coincide with its understanding — in an unified act of its fulfillment and realization. In other words, the inseparability of the contents of a cognitive act from its existence as the action of the world itself shall fix, and also identity of thinking and existence as an event of the world itself. Classical philosophy, starting from Descartes, just introduces the concept of ‘self-consciousness’ in its existentially ontological but not in a logical comprehension: *cogito* is neither the procedure of understanding, nor philosophical abstraction for understanding, it is really happening phenomenon of consciousness, i.e. a certain event, that has not epiphenomenal, but really existential nature. They are actions in reality or actions of reality — because cognition itself is a certain vital event, actually displaying in heads of living humans. *Cogito* thinking as special experience (form) of consciousness is a definite real act (together with other cognitive acts) in existence; before and outside which all arguments about cognition, about phenomenon of knowledge, and coincidence of structure of thought with the reality, described by it, have

no meaning. Distinguishing it among other cognitive acts is determined by its fundamental ontological structure: it is factuality and 'givenness' me to myself, like I for the first and each time discover myself again, is the condition, which determines all my existence and the possibilities of my existence. They are events-in-the-world of realization of me as an empirical subject, i.e. such a subject related thereto there is a reason to tell about the fulfilled experience, the received imagination, the accomplished knowledge.

In other words, raising the question about coincidence of thought imagination with cognized objects, philosophy of the Modern History reveals not understanding, but objectively acting layer of consciousness, wherein there exist 'merging' (Verwachsenheit), organic entity of existence and way of its existing, identity of cognitive subject and its activity, and conceptually fixes it in the appropriate theoretical construction of *cogito* or *Ichheit* kind.

This is the exposure of real ontology of the world. Consciousness is understood as certain unconditional and absolute event-act, relating to which we cannot imply any predicates or attributes, because we ourselves as empirical (psychical) beings, and all our thinking forms, and the whole our world as law-conformable, cognizable etc., are possible only after accomplishment-determination of these events.. All our experiences (revealings of 'I') are already inside of this act (appearance of consciousness), and we cannot arrive at this by any effort of our will. So consciousness is understood as absolutely non-objective, non-objectivated and an irreplaceable event in the structure of existence. In this meaning, consciousness is a movement or thought of God absolutely free of

accomplishment or the will-to-existence (*energeia*, *potentia*). This act of structuration of the existing and of us as subjects is a single action, from which we cannot move to the source: our 'I' is just the idea of God. Then realization of the happening is given by this existential chronothopy of conscious events: an attempt to think, in formal transcensus of thinking, subjectivity as certain objective phenomenon, entering the reality in such transcendental way, represents this lasting experience of appearance of consciousness (me in the world) and the world as synthesizing of time and space and as the production of phenomena and artifacts. Time and space themselves are the results of this vital movement of God, are the condition of our possibility to perceive, feel, and experience something. And in this meaning, time and space are objective forms of reality, given in the act of their realization together with the appearance of us, and thereby already putting restrictions to all our abilities. In other words, *cogito* is a certain *thopos* of containing 'I', the properties of which are the transcendentality of free action, existential comprehending (i.e. phenomenal) chronothopy of conscious phenomena, and restrictions imposed by the happening of these phenomena on their understanding, etc.

This is the real metaphysics of consciousness that is revealed by classical philosophy as a special meditative experience, that demands a special technique of meditation and thought. Consciousness is power, induced inside the world by our every step, and inseparable from us as living and feeling creatures: we do not see by what we see and what consists some transsubjective, and in this meaning 'ideal', 'flesh and blood'

of ourselves. It is not just a property of the theory ³, but the event, that is realized in all its apparency, but the property of existing, of existence, of realizing thought itself as an event of existence. This deeply reflective cognized and objective — in its essence and its method of revelation — beginning of activity and thinking serves for classical philosophy as the objectively given basis for explaining of all the phenomena of human existence.

Consciousness, comprehended in such a way, appears as *cogitatio*, i.e. not empirical, but transcendental or ‘pure’ consciousness. The transcendental of consciousness, in philosophical terms, is the recognition of non-objectivity and the non-objectivability of consciousness, and the indication of its practical efficacy and the ‘appearedness’ of vital experience. Consciousness is not a phenomenon, but an action itself. Transcendentality of consciousness is a vital empirical movement: God has thought, the world has moved — and irreversible processes have occurred — the world has crystallized in this motion, and the necessary connection of things has been stated. Including necessary connection of consciousness, understanding, observation, perceived by us as empirical connection of psychological meanings, impressions, associations, etc. We constitute ourselves in such a way, having determined by the fact of our occurrence as empirical creatures. In other words, the arguments of classical philosophy about ‘pure’ consciousness cannot be understood in a logical context, because all these categories — cogito, transcendental consciousness, ‘pure I’ etc.— are not ideas in the common meaning, but

³ This misunderstanding of nature of *cogito* and Descartes’ argument can clearly be seen in *Fifth Disquisitio of Gassendi*. See “*Meditationes*”. Ouvres. VII

they are characteristics of real ontology in the world of human phenomena. 'Pure' consciousness is not the indication of some empirically existing consciousness or psychologically revealing phenomenon. It is the recognition of factuality and necessity of realizing in the structure of existence such acts of consciousness that must be repeated every time and every moment, stating and certifying me as an empirical subject. "Pure I' is an event of the world, that constitutes the organization of the world, its law-conformity, intelligibility, etc., in which there is a place for the individual 'I'. This occupation of the own place in the world is the necessary moment of existing the world itself, without which it is not determined in the causal meaning. The causality of phenomena is being stated as a law after interaction of phenomena has really occurred in the world; the same applies to causing in us as living creatures some states, that are psychologically experienced by us as states of being understood, of being recognized, as states of thought. It is already impossible to penetrate into a 'pre-gravitational' state of linking of global forces after their completion, because we ourselves are already 'occured' by this very act. We are occurred as empirical 'I'.

In this meaning, consciousness is a phenomenon, i.e. a special thing, that has no essence outside of itself. If in the world there has happened an event of thought, soul, knowledge, and in such a way I appeared to myself, hence thereby in the world's structure, simultaneously with my appearance, there have occurred some irreversible changes and transformations, determining restrictions not only on the possibilities of the world, but on the possibilities to think of it. Consciousness, understood in its existential state, is a 'world point' of intersection of the line of the

nature and of the cognizing idea itself, in which there occurs existentially practical determination of the nature's mode of action in any case, if the mode of cognition, and how this mode — by its phenomenon of occurrence — is allowed by the world ⁴. This is an act of statement and determination (pre-determination, to be exact, because it pre-supposes participation of the living 'I') of existence itself at the point of performing of this act of consciousness. Here consciousness is the knowledge of what happened to knowledge in cognition, of the transformation of living, expanded within real space and in real time, action of thought imagination correlation to objects outside it with the image, behind which the action itself occurs unseen. So the category of consciousness is the indication of just the non-substantiality of the happened — ascertaining of linkage between objective action, corporeal change and sensual imagination, i.e. to the fact of understandability without imagination or interpretation in the objective meaning. It is the real binding of modes of thought and objects of reality, having expanded as an act of comprehension, but irreducible to its objective composition. Therefore, phenomenological treatment of consciousness — as of the experience of objective, sensual putting by consciousness the world as special object and subject as a real subject of cognition — is repeating and having to be repeated once and again the ontological possibility of cognition as an efficacy itself.

That understanding of transcendence and irreversibility (individuation) of consciousness is the basis of understanding consciousness

⁴ Cp. Spinoza's arguments in "Ethica" about the adequate idea of a thing as of a state of body, understood as actual objectual motion along the form of the thing itself. This understanding of thinking as a method of action of a body, i.e. spatially spread phenomenon, is the basis of his theory of substance.

as a phenomenal existence by classical philosophy. We can say that all New-European philosophy is being built as transcendental ontology. Its concepts allow us to analyze consciousness in its ontological meaning and in its 'corporeality', not connecting it to states of psyche, and abstracting from the human as a subject of the latter. The improbable abstraction of *cogito* or 'pure consciousness', nevertheless, is really fulfilling, because consciousness and thought is action itself, and the result and product of such living action is our empirical and psychological 'I'. The category of 'reflexion' or 'self-consciousness', produced by philosophy, is, in its essence, a special tool for keeping *cogito* in the state of consciousness, for being *cogito* in these states, because concerning consciousness as an actual phenomenon, the description of conditions, under which it can 'appear' or 'be induced', is possible. All the differences between empirism and transcendentalism is in reality the different ways to this transcendental *Ego*: to split the psychological experience and the transcendental one is very difficult due to their merging, and in the artificial construction of reflexion the realized experience is built as a set of modi — of sense, of impression, of imagination, etc. The description of these consciousness modi is the way of empirism, the description of consciousness existence possibility conditions as aggregate of these modi.

When Hegel in his philosophy raises a question about appearance of knowledge and shows that reflexion is really an empty concept, i.e. is understood as phenomenon, that shows itself, then he continues this tradition of transcendently phenomenological analysis of consciousness. Really, his claim of soul as emptiness or as a receptacle (das

Rezeptakulum) of everything, which includes everything ⁵, is the same understanding of actuality of consciousness phenomenon, as Descartes'. The soul is actually always present, but not the whole soul. The whole soul is present in full development of time, whereas in the imagination — *hic et nunc* — it appears in an empirical way as something solitary, and is understood by us as the aggregate of solitary impressions; they are the tatter that we take for its essence. Whereas it is the connection, the receivability of those separate, but connected by us 'in time', experiences (time itself is the change of those experiences). It is this 'joinness' in time (in our imagination already) that is known to be in the fundament of traditional representation of the substantiality of soul. We imagine it to be so, but the soul is not a thing, it is an action of *intro*-receivability or connection of imaginations. This connection of the 'solitaries' and their existence 'at once', as a whole' and 'together' is that very idea of soul, when we think it. It is in the moment of thinking of its idea, because here thought itself is action of soul. This action of soul as thinking its idea is reflexion. Therefore Hegel's reflection does not appear as a purely logical act — knowledge of action, which is included in knowledge itself, but as some experience of consciousness, as 'work' of living soul here and now. It is the action of subjectivity, in which there exists a non-differentiation between the identity of the existence of consciousness and the mode of its realization, to be exact — form of its appearance — thinking. As a logical contentual act, it is a premise of cognition, situated not inside but outside it, i.e. it is really onto-logical premise, given together with cognitive acts themselves. As a step of thought, this statement of Hegel in

⁵ Hegel. "*Encyclopädie d. philosoph. Wissenschaft*". Quot. after Гегель Г.В.Ф. Энциклопедия философских наук. Т.1. М., 1974. С. 123.

its real contents does not differ from Kant's statement, that transcendental actions of consciousness are valid not by presence of substance, included in them, but by their practical disclosures — revealing, practical realization of a logical (gnoseological) function of pure forms of reason with the contents of experience (synthesis of contemplation).

Nevertheless, from the very beginning Hegel treats reality itself in a different way, because it is known to appear in his work as consciousness (spirit as such), supposing itself in a form of an object. Correspondingly he puts the conditions of possibility of experience under the leadership of consciousness to be changed. So Hegel leads the analyzed understanding of consciousness by classical philosophy to its logical hypostasing: his identity of idea and existence is not an establishment of understanding consciousness as existence, but a theoretically-cognitive premise and the principle of analysis of historical forms of human cognition. From this point of view, reflection really, factually — in acts of human thinking as reconstructed by Hegel,— turns to reflection over the logical contents of knowledge. Here consciousness first appears as an external relation of 'givenness' of an object of cognition, then as internally stressed self-differentiation in itself, and at last, as an identity with itself in phenomena of humanized, spiritualized reality. Cognition, as a whole, appears as thinking by categories — 'thinking in concepts' — of its own forms and revelations, and finally turns to a 'canonical' ordering of objectivated forms and revelations in the process of revealing the cognition realized in such a way. So in Hegelian philosophy the problem of understanding is eliminated: as far as the reason in real contents of

knowledge lacks any means of objectivation, so the contents of reason can be achieved thru usual reflexive interpretation of implicit cultural mechanisms of cognition. The problem of actual presentation of consciousness is eliminated here.

This 'logicalization' of consciousness or 'ontologation' of logics has allowed to spread a vast scene of development of historical forms of human cognition and culture, and by that, determine new horizons of philosophical thought. Nevertheless, such formulations of the question turns the loss of the 'living' cognitive process, reducing it to either cultural reproductive mechanisms or a psychological interpretation of its individual revelations. The psychologization of consciousness in philosophy has happened. The recognition of the fact has reflected in the turn of philosophy of 20th century to the analysis of 'living' consciousness.

The specific feature of modern philosophy, independently of difference between their trends, ideological orientations, language etc., is that this philosophy is known to raise a question about the necessity of qualifying human existence as the decisive point of all philosophical problems. This also determines its relation to classical philosophy in the formulating a consciousness problem: if classical philosophy and cognitive theory takes the question of personal existence of consciousness as a real problem, so modern philosophy treats just the question about total significance of truths and about intersubjective nature of consciousness as a problem. Appeal to the analysis of the world of daily experience and affirmation that Kantian or Cartesian *cogito* can not explain us the essence of cognition as such, because they alone — as certain

experimental acts — need to be explained, presuppose the development of the other way to transcendental *Ego*.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that modern philosophy abdicates classical differentiation between ‘phenomenon’ and ‘essence’, but treats the experience of consciousness as a ‘phenomenon’, as ‘vital forms’, as *dasein*, where everything is immanent, and acts of consciousness are already indistinguishable (*cogito* are not already specially picked out from all the continuum of cognitive acts), in spite of all these facts, consciousness is still explained ontologically and transcendently.

This difference in the ways of ‘catching’ living subjectivity is determined here by the change of the aim of philosophical thinking. Really, Husserl, having the problem to reveal the immanent structure of consciousness — the existence of ‘pure phenomena’, treats consciousness as givenness, in which everything takes place and hence, is observed as premise of philosophical work, that we need not to specially ground. So the task of phenomenological analysis is concluded in revelation of essentialistic structure of consciousness, irrespective of its existential contents. In other words, the analysis of consciousness presupposes ontological neutrality with respect to objects of experiences themselves, because the ‘pure’ structure of consciousness acts is reached irrespective of the presence of their objective reference. It can be reached by the totality of special procedures of work with living consciousness — the series of psychological, eidetical, and at last, transcendental reduction.⁶ It is connected to the fact that the primary understanding of consciousness

⁶ E. Husserl. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Quot. after “Язык и интеллект”.— М., 1995. С.14-49

links with the phenomenon of the world as a correlate of ontologically understood consciousness: immanent intentionality of consciousness means that the world as — in such a way, in this act of consciousness, in this experience — opening reality is not the thing that opposes like any other object of cognition, but the thing, in which we have already stated, the thing that we reproduce by the fact of our being as conscious creatures. We never could have seen a thing, should the matter have been in sensual perception. Looking at a thing, we simultaneously create to it a context of perception, some reasonable horizon as a background to perceive it. This is own analytics of consciousness, some kind of articulation that anticipates each work of understanding — similar to Cartesian *cogito* or Kantian transcendental apperception. Thus phenomenology demands the consideration of existence as a correlate of consciousness, that which is ‘thought about’ by us concerning properties of revealing consciousness. Phenomenological reduction is that procedure of ‘stretching’ the operation of this — transnatural and unnoticeable by us — the own ‘analytics’ of consciousness, to be precise — its intending: we cannot leave this work of consciousness behind (because ourselves are — psychologically experienced — the result of this work), but we can as if relegate it, intending to stable structures, which can be seen thru specific and reducible meanings. That is why later in Husserl’s works, the investigation of intentional structures of consciousness changes to procedures of construction, *ideation of ideas*, free variation in fantasy. Nevertheless, this phenomenological reduction as the way to transcendental *Ego* is based upon the recognition that consciousness is an ontological phenomenon, some transcendental act in existence. And in this

meaning it repeats classical philosophy: in phenomenology the objectivity itself is constituted by radical self-reduction of subjectivity to own primary structures. Husserl in *'Cartesianische Meditationen'* returns to *cogito* consciousness: transcendental reduction cleans consciousness to the area of absolute consciousness, the structure of which is *ego — cogito — cogitatum*. “Transcendancy in any form is self-constituting meaning of existence within the limits of ‘I’. Any conceivable meaning, any conceivable existence, whether is is named immanent or transcendental, is outlined by an area of transcendental subjectivity as constituting meaning and existence. It is useless to try to comprehend the universum of original existence as something outside the universum of possible consciousness, possible cognition, and possible obviousness”⁷. In fact it is the recognition that *ego cogito* is not just abstraction, but a real state of affairs in the world — the phenomenon of transcendancy of consciousness as its living existentiality.

Nevertheless, the primary intention of phenomenology to describe immanent structures of consciousness (intentional structures in their ontological neutrality) leads to the fact that this loss of essentiality of consciousness turns to the fact that transcendancy is being really rejected, and transcendental ontology is being built as eidetic ontology. It reveals at once, when phenomenology turns to ontology (in “Crisis of European Sciences...”): the world is understood just as a correlate of consciousness, but not as space in which among others there takes place a phenomenon of consciousness as something existing and essential.

⁷ E. Husserl. *Cartesianische Meditationen*. - Hua, I, S.86. Quot. after Свасьян К.А. *Феноменологическое познание*.— Ереван, 1986.

Thus M. Heidegger, having formulated the idea of his fundamental ontology, comes from the necessity of leaning against such experience of existence of subject, that supposedly is known neither to classical nor to transcendental phenomenology. He begins from the statement that the question about existence primarily 'sends' the asking one to a certain experience, in which this existence is found to be 'accessible'. Existence demands its own method of existence-revealing, which primarily and essentially differs from all forms of conceiving the existing: therefore it is as if it could be detected neither with the help of abstractions 'essence-event (phenomenon)', nor with the help of the concept of 'phenomenon'. The point is the discovery of a certain experience of ingenuous givenness of existence, and the problem is to qualify existence of the existing, which possesses the possibility of asking questions about its existence. This 'the existing' is a human, and experience of existence of the existing is *existentia (Da-sein)*, i.e. special and always individual experience of existence of subject-in-the-world, of his non-spatial, but objectively-reasonable *situ-ation*. Existence is being analyzed in connection with this 'the existing': the existing is that, what is in one way or another determined thru existence, and vice versa, existence, as it is exposed to us, is a moment of *Da-sein* structure. Thus, ontology, according to Heidegger, is possible only as a phenomenology of the description of existence, of *hic-being*. This point reveals the paradox of formulating the question in such a way, and phenomenological description gives way to hermeneutical interpretation: the objectness, that must be described is non-objective *existentia*, and it is always indetermined. An act of happening of existence is not determined while it has not happened; by

the happening itself the world is finally determined and the connections between objects and phenomena is stated. Existentialia is pure temporality; the possibility of 'the existing' for itself to be and not to be itself is existentialia, i.e. transcending of existence by each step of its happening and objective description (the objective description is itself the act of transcending, because it is a real and objective event, an event in reality). Therefore, phenomenologically describing Dasein as the possibility of the existence, we discover its 'closedness', its apophaticity. This discovery of the apophaticity of existence as back cover of finiteness of '*hic*-being', is really the description of the original nature of existing. Fundamental ontology, therefore, is really the ontological basis for human existence. In this meaning, fundamental ontology is the expanded phenomenology of life, constant transcendency of itself.

This analysis of thinking steps in modern philosophy shows that the introduction of new concepts ('phenomenon', 'vital forms', 'existentials', etc.) and new procedures for consciousness analysis (phenomenological reduction, language destruction etc.) is connected precisely to the change of aim and to the development of new methods of analysis of objective nature of consciousness. In this meaning modern philosophy as if from the very beginning discovers essentiality of consciousness, and from this point of view all the differences between classical philosophy and modern are not so serious, because they still have in common the principle that the ontological understanding of consciousness as a certain action in existence, its existentiality and phenomenality, but not epiphenomenality.

3.

Such philosophical understanding of objective nature of consciousness is the foundation for a scientifically correct formulation of the question about ‘corporeality’ of consciousness. Philosophical analysis demands the understanding of consciousness as an objective action, irrevercible and transcendent relative to its empirically fixed presentations.

As an objective phenomenon consciousness must be comprehended as the interaction between objective reality and the human body, materially expanded and fulfilling in reality itself. The problem is that in the universum conscious acts possess irrevercibility as objective phenomena; being the relation in reality consciousness performs as transcendent, with respect to the language of internal experience, action of adhesion of objective-practical action, as sensual cloth of corporeal feelings and performed meanings. This interaction appears as a natural objective action, that has its own ‘space’ and its own ‘time’ (history), and by no means is identical to its realization in the substratum of the human body — in the form of perceptive images and psychological experiences of meanings. Vice versa, it is necessary to understand the latter as real actional-semiotical and symbolical transformations of this objective action, and as such — caused by it. Therefore the consciousness ‘corporeality’ problem is simply the problem of the ‘embeddedness’ of phenomenal matter of actionally symbolical acts of consciousness and psyche into the eventual row of historical, social and cultural reality.

Really it is the irreversibility of the course of events, including action of subjectivity , that makes this subjectivity real. In real space and time of the conscious act there is material, living motion, practically

expanded as objectual position of our body in the objectual reality and simultaneously contracted as symbolical substitution into experience and sensual image. It is as if living motion itself has two poles — empirically fixed change of position in objective space among external objects, and causation by this very change of respective images, thru which this change is experienced. Therefore in reality we cannot, by a simultaneous action, trace motion in objective reality, that generates this tracing. So the *corpus* of consciousness is not a human body, taken in its anthropomorphic structure, but is in reality expanded each time *hic et nunc* sequence and simultaneity of living motion of objective practical action of individuum and substantial outcome of phenomenal matter of living experience. A human body here performs just like a functional organ of these transformations and adhesions. This is the objectively practical ‘body’ of consciousness life, expanded and existing outside an individual head, this is the sole reality, included subjectivity, that is not an idea or spiritual essence.

This is specific matter of living experience of conceiving body, it is that ‘*thopos*’ of idea and ‘I’ that classical philosophy pointed at. Consciousness in all its modi, as inseparable by discrete and sequential observations in time, enters the world transcendently, i.e. is produced and generated materially and is able to be localized ‘body’ of actual adhesions *hic et nunc* of living motion (sensomotorical acts) to objects of practical activity of an individual. This actual adhesion of feeling to the ‘physics’ of objective practical situations *hic et nunc* by its happening ‘sticks together’ into single junction of this state of psyche and state of the external world, into stable connection, presented and understood as

meaning. This stable connection is 'thopos', 'corpus', not internal, but objective space and place of existing of these acts of consciousness. Consciousness or subjectivity is expanded in time substantial practical action of contraction of practically obtained connectivities of the objective situation itself in all its space of actual action into ideal sensual images.

Really, this process presents as a practical realization of symbolization, i.e. some quite substantial action: fundamental perceptive categories — space, time, motion, shape, color, position etc. which serve as a practical landmarks, as a fundamental of practical activity of an individuum, contracted in sensual images, and thus, hidden by this actionally-symbolical work. These primary layers, being the fundamental living motion of perceptive experience of consciousness (being its biodynamic and sensual tissue) contracted, but not simply covered, by other 'upper' layers of consciousness — by sensual images, images of fantasy, imagination etc. ⁸ This contraction is living motion itself, with 'sediments' in form of states, internally experienced and described as such in intraspective terms. A human as if moves to the world of meanings and concepts, reflects as to 'upper' layers of the world, built by him, consciously operating with objective images, words, symbols and meanings. But those sensual transformations must always take place to perform the perception as individually sensual act: all mental images, that can be described in the language of internal feeling, and determined now (i.e. after performance of the perception act) in terms of aim, reason,

⁸ The concept of 'layer of consciousness' is a concept of meta-language, language of study and theoretical description, but not of natural language if the consciousness. In the meaning of proposed description of actionally symbolical work of consciousness, the latter is *tabula rasa*.

emotion, realized reflective acts, aimed action etc., relates to this definite system of motions — ‘adhesions’, ‘substitutions’, ‘transformations’ — inside this lasting sensual experience as forms of existing and expression of the given perceptive structure. In this unique experience of motions construction, psyche of a human has become the unique ‘place’ of transformation of a human body into inorganic corpus of consciousness and meaning in its literal meaning, and vice versa, transindividual by nature field of meaning in described real objective actions of living consciousness begins to exist as something organic, inseparable from the subject’s body. Therefore this living structure of objective action in the perceptive structure of a body is the action of production or performing those stable mental formations of psyche — ‘upper’ layers, by which we mean the surrounding world and their own contents, but behind which ‘contraction’ crystallization’, ‘structuration’ has performed on this sensual cloth of living interactions, and so our consciousness does not see itself and its actions. Extracting of these formations is the revelation of dependence of upper, characterized by intelligence and ideality, layers of spatial-temporal interactions and motions, and it is practically impossible operation, because they can be revealed just in this extratemporal and extraspatial reality of the ideal.

Those formations of consciousness appears to be such ideal models, ideality of which is in ‘presentation’ in them this stated connection of sensual experience with symbolical meaning. To be exact, they are themselves the ‘presentation’ of this connection, its substantial representation. This representation is phenomenality as existing; it is not a representation of something to somebody, but a representation as form

of existing. Ideality or phenomenality of sensual images of consciousness is the indication at their existing as at ‘presentings’ of substantial realization of consciousness, i.e. its transcendental. The presentations themselves reveals as objectivities of consciousness, that possess now own ideal space and time. Not objective space-time of their realization, but quasi-space and quasi-time of presentation of understandability.⁹ In the there as if is eliminated (aufhaben) that living action of consciousness, that has turned around and gone, contracting, into these presentations. Meaning is that phenomenon of representation, ‘presentation’ in ideal form of sensual image of passed living motion and production of perceptive structure. In this meaning — meaning is a thing of our comprehension. In this meaning our ‘I’ is also ‘a presenting’ or a model of understanding, but the model as living lasting existence, related to the definite system of motions of living experience. This presenting has meaning while this experience of its conscious thinking is fulfilling; the understanding of that has found its mirroring in the thesis of classical philosophy about an idea as a form of existing of a soul: ‘I’ exists only in the moment of its thinking, i.e. as an idea of ‘I’. In this meaning our empirical ‘I’ is just a product of ‘pure I’ or God.¹⁰ It is just an indication at

⁹ Within the frames of understanding of ideality of this time the problems of Zeitbewußtsein in Husserl’s “Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins”.

¹⁰ Cp.: “ there is self-consciousness, generating the imagination **I conceive**, which must have the possibility to accompany all the other imaginations and be the same in every consciousness, therefore this self-consciousness cannot be accompanied by any other (imagination) so I call it also the **primary apperception**. I also call its entity **transcendental** entity of self-consciousness to mark the possibility of apriori cognition on the basis of this entity. Really, diverse imaginations that are given in certain contemplation would not be **my** imaginations if they do not belong all together to self-consciousness alone; in other words, being my imaginations (although I would not realize them as such), nevertheless they necessarily must conform in self-

factual symbolical character and ideality of images of consciousness as their modelity and representativity of practical realizability of consciousness.

Therefore meaning is eventual in principle, it is that is thought in- and together with what happened in the world. Meaning, understood as knowledge is the event of realization of thought. And so meaning is practical, realizing from the beginning each time, 'connection' of objective contents of knowledge (which is contracted and compressed 'former' experience, that took place before as actual experience of knowledge — stating of understanding) with the state of sensual apparatus, i.e. with the course of action of the reality itself. In other words, the phenomenon of transformation of states of objective reality into objects of living subjectivity. The way we understand, explain etc. knowledge depends on that how thought happened for the first time, and since that it always happen in such a way, determining utmost possibilities of existence. Something in the experience of an individuum has becomes a fact of his life, if it has any meaning, i.e. actually realized in transcendental way connection of objective situation and its 'sediment' in sensual apparatus.

This happening now becomes a constant of consciousness, determining now, as a law, all the current and experience of psychical and conscious human life. It is impossible now to get back to the primary state of absence of meaning, because in the meaning objective scheme of work of psyche as natural process is presented in the ideal way.

consciousness, because otherwise they do not all belong to me." I. Kant. "Kritik d. reinen Vernunft". Quot. after Кант И. Соч. В 6-ти т. Т. III. М., 1964. С.191-192.

Therefore, those ‘adhesions’, ‘substitutions’, ‘structurations’ are practical work of psyche and consciousness, pure ‘corporeality’ of subjectivity, taken in its spatial-temporal entity and irreducible to own psychologically experienced images. In other words, this is not an experience of consciousness, which observes produced actions from outside, but the product itself, determined by them. Consciousness is naturally acting force, and so each psychological process may be observed both from the side of its objects, and from the side of the consciousness itself. This shift to the act of appearance of consciousness is that very attempt of ‘stretching’ of consciousness field over those living transformations, over what it has already closed in the inseparability of the ideal. ‘Splitting’ of these formations of consciousness, connected in the process of their realization with their products — images, understanding construction, language forms, categories of thought, etc. appears to be a complex procedure of phenomenological reduction (but not in Husserl’s variant). Each new remarking and shift of focus and periphery as a tool of reflexion presents a new experience of consciousness. Therefore each identification and differentiation, when a subject need to implicitly identify himself with one pole of consciousness field — the only condition, under which they can be together in the single common perception, of the object of action — is the ‘transfer’ of it into other state or structure, accompanied by its ‘corporeal’ reconstruction. Each structure of consciousness (imagination) correspond its own ‘corporeality’ or phenomenal spreadness. All the abstract constructs like *cogito*, ‘reflexions’, ‘ideation of ideas’, ‘epoche operations’ etc. are tools of philosophical

analysis and work with individually-objective and semantic cloth of consciousness.

This interpretation of existence consciousness and psyche with attraction of fundamental spatial-temporal and objectively-semantic categories is a new experience of consciousness. But this use of special understanding models is not simply an apparatus of thought, with the help of which one can avoid traps of screening own consciousness. The matter is that independently of any method of philosophical analysis, our psyche works in this way, opening thru its quasiobjective formations the space of the possible world of consciousness and further development in it and thru it empirical psychological structures themselves.

4.

Modern psychology connects the solution of consciousness 'corporeality' problem and the possibility of its objective analysis with the refusal of any naturalistic interpretation of it and understanding dual organization of phenomena of conscious life, that follows from the very nature of a human as feeling and living creature. Understanding consciousness as existential, practical phenomenon in the structure of existence presupposes the introduction in scientific circulation some fundamental items of its analysis.

First, it presuppose the elimination of premise of classical philosophy and psychology (in *cogito* theory) to take givenness of consciousness itself for a reference point. It is necessary to distinguish psychology of consciousness and ontology of it. Consciousness is not a psychological proces in its classical psychophysiological meaning, it is not

one of psychical processes, but some level, at which all specific psychological processes are synthesized. To be exact, it is a section of their givenness or existence. Therefore all phenomena of human psyche may be regarded as phenomena of consciousness; not because of their having become object of consciousness, as it is presupposed by classical procedure of reflexion, but exceptionally because of their possibility to be regarded as natural functions or dimensions (modi) of consciousness.

Second, it means understanding of difference between consciousness itself and the language of its givenness or description. Consciousness as naturally historical phenomenon is such a phenomenon, whereof the method of realization eliminates conditions, in which it lives and exists. The peculiarity of consciousness is that it is a phenomenon possessing the property of self-designation; in other words, as a specific object consciousness is identical to its interpretation. Thus for consciousness it is important to differentiate the 'language' of consciousness itself and 'language of explorer' or meta-language of its description. But this means that each description of consciousness is its new experience.

Third, understanding of consciousness as objective phenomenon presupposes possibility and necessity to analyze it without the description in the language of internal experience etc. The objectivity presupposes that we can describe such phenomena, of which their natural revealings contain in itself subjectively-actional transformations of reality as sediments. The objective description of consciousness means in this case the possibility of its description regardless to changes of psychophysiological, feeling apparatus, generally regardless to human

individual and his body. It is a true description of consciousness in an 'inhuman way'. The principal cause of it is in the idea that cognitive theory must first refuse of psychological qualities in its primary constructions, to introduce them later as phenomena of consciousness, of specific consciousness, but not as something naturally given. We can never objectively detail the sides of psychological process until we put subjectivity or consciousness as a necessary element of the objective reality.

This understanding of consciousness as objective phenomenon in existence presupposes revealing of real ontology of the world and comes out as a problem of philosophical ontology. This ontology must give the description of structure of existence and consciousness as free, non-causal, but non-eliminable and necessary element in existence, without which the existence itself is not complete. It presupposes the development of special theoretical constructions, that must come out as 'pseudo-topological' concepts or 'quasi-objectivities' of consciousness permitting objectively discuss about consciousness, avoiding traditional interpretations and distinguishing between real status of things and consciousness, and describing conscious phenomena in all their spatial-temporal organization. ¹¹

This philosophical cognitive theory appears methodology for psychology, because the psychology, that regards states of consciousness as internally integral, must produce its own symbolical constructs, allowing to objectively describe 'corporeality' of subjectivity. Attaching

¹¹ M.K. Mamardashvili. Classical and non-classical ideal of rationality. Moscow, 1994, pp.80-89.

spatial-temporal properties to psychological reality is no more conditional than using symbolical constructs in physics for the description of phenomena of microcosm: the using of 'understanding' things with regard to consciousness is the necessary step of disidentification and splitting of 'intelligible matter' of happening consciousness. Then we can in theoretical analysis go not from present formation of consciousness, which are irreversible and inseparable due to its own free activity, but from these symbolical 'quasi-objectivities of consciousness' and our symbolical apparatus as objective description of consciousness, to appearance of contential objects of psyche, ideal objects of motivation, secondary processes, i.e. to the mere work of consciousness, that performs in these secondary processes as in individual psychological mechanisms. It must provide exit outside internal, psychologically screened by appropriate organization (our 'I'), reality into 'the world of births' of primary meanings. That means not to only understand psyche and consciousness as actional-semiotic process, connected to free activity of substantially-symbolical overdesignations and encodings of consciousness, but to fix in some continuously traced action extratemporal (quasi-temporal with regard to objective time of its performance) states of 'dissolvedness' in objective, but not in objectual, reality, which accompany creative acts. Only in this case, I suppose, it will be possible to enter in psychology actual 'effect of the real' and to describe human psyche as living action and act.

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